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The Australian baby bonus offering parents $3,000 on the birth of a new child was 
announced on May 11 2004. The availability of five years of birth data following the 
introduction of the baby bonus allows for a more comprehensive analysis of the policy 
implications than is current in the literature. The focus of this paper is to identify if there is a 
positive fertility choice response to the introduction of the Australian baby bonus policy and 
if this response is sustained over time.  To do this 19 years of birth and macroeconomic data, 
beginning 1990, is analysed using an unobservable components model. The results indicate a 
significant increase in birth numbers ten months following the announcement of the baby 
bonus, and this overall increase was sustained up to the end of the observed period. A 
cumulative growth in birth numbers which commenced in January 2006 slows in 2008 and 
2009.  It is suggested that the initial increase in births, identified in March 2005, is a direct 
fertility response to the introduction of the policy and that the subsequent change in the 
growth of birth numbers may be the result of a delayed effect working through a number of 
channels. It is estimated that approximately 119,000 births are attributable to the baby bonus 
over the period, at an approximate cost of $39000 per extra child. 
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1) Introduction and background 
Declining fertility levels are a major concern for many developed economies as they are 
associated with higher dependency ratios (McDonald and Kippen, 2001).  Australia is no 
exception - the fertility rate in 2003, prior to the introduction of the baby bonus, was 1.75 
which is considerably lower than the estimated replacement level of 2.1 children per female.  
In response to low fertility levels, the Australian Government announced the introduction of 
the Baby Bonus in May 2004, a policy specifically designed to increase fertility levels. There 
have been a number of adjustments to the policy since its inception. Initially the federal 
government pledged each mother a lump sum payment of $3,000 for each child born after 
30th June 2004. This amount was subsequently increased in July 2006 and July 2008 to $4000 
and $5000 respectively1. There are no studies to date that have considered whether the baby 
bonus has had a sustained effect on the national fertility rate, nor any that have attempted to 
gauge the impact of macroeconomic influences on the fertility rate in Australia over the same 
period. By using a structural time series model (Harvey 1991) we examine the impact of the 
baby bonus policy on fertility in Australia until September 2009.  In particular the number of 
births per 1000 women of child bearing age is modeled with a view to determine whether the 
baby bonus has had a temporary or sustained effect on fertility levels. Economic determinants 
are also controlled for. Thus, this investigation goes some way to addressing the apparent 
gaps in the literature. 
A temporary fertility effect may take two forms.  First, a short term policy introduction effect 
exists if couples are sufficiently motivated to have children as a result of the publicity 
surrounding the announcement of the policy.  Given such an effect, the number of births 
would temporarily increase approximately 9 months following the announcement before 
returning to their long run path after a short period of time.  The second type of temporary 
effect is a compression effect. This is the case when the timing of births is brought forward as 
a result of the policy.  If a compression effect occurs the fertility rate would temporarily 
                                               
1
 A significant change also occurred on the 1 January 2009. Specifically the Baby bonus was means tested and 
payable in 13 equal installments if the total family income equaled $75,000 or less, in the first 6 months 
following the birth of the child.  It is difficult however to determine what effects this might have had given that 
not enough data following this policy change is available at this point in time. 
 3 
increase and then decrease relative to the long run path. Importantly the decrease would be 
sufficiently large enough to offset the increase thus having a net effect of zero on fertility 
levels. 
 
A priori, however, there is no reason to assume that the baby bonus will have only a 
temporary effect on fertility, as the initial fertility response may be maintained, or even 
magnified, over time.  Endogenous social norm effects may act to influence the fertility 
choices of women who were not initially directly affected by the subsidy itself. An 
individual’s fertility decision making may change not only because of a change in 
government payments but also because of the behaviour of their peers.  
 
Furthermore, a delayed fertility response may emerge, due to resource constraints and policy 
information lags. Individuals and couples may need to acquire additional financial resources 
and put in place social and medical supports before they have children2. This may be 
particularly relevant for couples engaging in Assisted Reproductive Technology (ART) 
procedures, (i,e., IVF) which have become increasingly popular in recent years3.  Therefore 
although decisions to have a child may be made in a timely fashion, the actual fertility 
response may take longer to occur. 
 
Previous studies suggest that a pronatalist policy can have a positive effect on fertility, 
although the cost tends to be high.  For example Gauthier and Hatzius (1997) simultaneously 
consider cash benefits and maternity leave. The dependent variable they used is the log of 
total fertility using data from 22 industrialized countries from 1970-1990. Their results found 
the decision to bear a child was affected by “its direct cost which is lowered by the 
government subsidy, but not by the opportunity costs involved in taking time off work” 
(Gauthier and Hazius 1997 pg 300). They also found that increasing assistance for the first 
child had a greater effect on fertility than for subsequent children. The economic control 
                                               
2
 A recent study by the Australian Institute for Family Studies (Gray et al 2008) suggests that individuals, on 
average want to have more children than the replacement fertility level of 2.1, however due to financial 
constraints, as well as work related issues and partnership issues, have no plans to do so. 
3
Increasing from 6792 live births in 2004 to 10633 live births in 2008 Table 35, page 43,  Assisted reproductive 
technology in Australia and New Zealand 2008, AIHW, ASSISTED REPRODUCTION TECHNOLOGY SERIES  
Number 14 
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variables they used include unemployment, men's wages, women's wages, and the change in 
the unemployment rate.  
 
Counter to theoretical expectation they found men’s wages positive yet insignificant and 
women's wages negative and only significant at the 10% level.  The change in the 
unemployment rate was found to be highly significant.  In addition differences were noted 
between subgroups - no evidence was found that cash benefits affect fertility in the Anglo 
Saxon countries; however benefits had a large and consistent effect in the Scandinavian 
countries, with continental and southern Europe in between. (Gauthier and Hazius 1997).  
  
A policy implemented in the province of Quebec that paid families up to $8,000 for having a 
child4 provides a natural experiment in fertility choice and as such has stimulated some 
interesting studies. Milligan (2005) found evidence that the policy achieved its goal of 
increased fertility and attributed 93,000 births to the policy over the ten year period of the 
policy. Milligan (2005) also found that higher income was associated with a larger fertility 
effect for cash payments5. 
 
Preceding Milligan (2005), Duclos, Lefebvre and Merrigan (2001) used a difference in 
difference estimator to identify the impact of the Quebec baby bonus scheme. They found 
that generous family benefits do have an effect on fertility rates, in particular providing 
strong incentive to give birth to a third child in Quebec.  
 
The Australian baby bonus scheme has also received significant research attention since its 
inception in 2004. Much of the economic analysis on the Australian baby bonus has been 
focused on distortionary birth timing effects, fertility intentions, or state specific impacts.  
 
For example, Gans and Leigh (2006) have analysed the short term birth timing effects of the 
introduction of the policy. They used daily birth numbers from 1975-2004 focusing on the 
days immediately preceding and following July 1 of each year. Using standard regression 
techniques they conclude that up to 1,000 births (primarily discretionary caesareans) may 
                                               
4
 The Allowance for Newborn Children, gave a payment of $500 for a first child and up to $8,000 for a third. 
5
 This is consistent with experience of the baby bonus in Western Australia (see Lane, 2010, discussed 
below) 
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have been moved as a result of the introduction of the baby bonus. Based on similar analysis 
of the 2006 baby bonus increase, they conclude approximately 600 births were moved in this 
instance (Gans and Leigh 2007). 
 
Drago et al (2009) make use of HILDA6 household panel data to assess if the baby bonus 
increased fertility intentions and thereby births, and if the effects were temporary or 
sustained. They investigate whether the effects were concentrated among particular income 
groups and those women who already had children. A simultaneous equations approach was 
used, with fertility intentions treated as endogenous in a model predicting births, thus testing 
the effect of the baby bonus on fertility intentions. Their analysis included variables that 
capture the opportunity cost of birth such as labour force status, education and income. They 
found that fertility intentions rose after the announcement of the Baby Bonus, and the birth 
rate was estimated to have risen modestly as a result. Their results that are largely consistent 
with the opportunity cost approach. 
 
Lain et al (2009) use a Poisson regression analysis of New south Wales (NSW) birth numbers 
and Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) Population estimates to assess the effect of the 
baby bonus on birth rates. They analysed the change in the birth rates in 2005 and 2006 
relative to the trend before the introduction of the bonus and find that birth rates increased, 
especially in those women having their second or subsequent child.  
 
A further study by Lain (2010) has evaluated the impact of the baby bonus on New South 
Wales (NSW) health services and they estimate an additional 11,283 births per year in NSW 
due to the baby bonus, at a cost to the health care system of an additional $60 million in 2008 
(Lain et al 2010) 7. An analysis of the policy impact in Western Australia was conducted by 
Langridge et al (2010), and using similar statistical techniques to Lain et al, they found a 
positive increase in fertility particular in women residing in higher socioeconomic areas.  
 
                                               
6
 Refer to Wooden and Watson (2007) for a detailed description of the Household, Income and Labour 
dynamics in Australia Survey (HILDA) 
7
 Negative binominial regression was used on data from 1998 – 2004 to generate a predicted number of births 
in 2008. The predicted number was then compared with observed numbers to identify a deviation from the 
pre baby bonus trend.  
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2. Theoretical background 
 
Much of the economic theory of fertility within the rational choice framework originates 
from the works of Gary Becker (1960) and Harvey Leibenstein (1957). It is assumed that 
fertility is a conscious decision and the essence of the model is that families balance the 
benefit against cost of an additional child, given that children are assumed to be a normal 
good8. Therefore, fertility behaviour can be analysed within a choice theoretic framework 
wherein family size (given preferences) is the result of variations in income and the “costs” 
inclusive of the opportunity cost of children (Hotz et al 1993). The “cost” variable 
incorporates the theory of the allocation of time, the concepts of household production theory 
and human capital investment theory. Given that the rearing of children is considered time 
intensive relative to other household production, the cost of child bearing (and rearing) is in 
the most part a function of the mother’s time. The interaction of these variables is complex in 
the context of fertility choice, for example rising female labour participation rates, less 
gender specialisation, and higher human capital investment and wages for women represents 
rising family incomes yet a higher opportunity cost to childbearing. Therefore the relative 
strength of the income and substitution effects is of significance when assessing the influence 
of changing family policy on fertility. Ultimately a universal subsidy to lower the cost or 
“price” of children would be expected to increase the demand for children and this would be 
reflected in higher birth numbers.   
 
Recent developments in the family economics literature have also highlighted the role of the 
social climate and social interactions on fertility choice. The rational choice model of fertility 
has been extended to include social interaction, on the basis that individuals use the 
situational information available to them. Becker and Murphy (2003), suggest that “the 
number and education of children are affected by the behaviour of friends, peers and 
neighbours…… births within a group could respond sharply to small changes in explanatory 
variables because the social multiplier magnifies the responses of the members of the same 
social group” (Becker and Murphy 2003 page 21). Economic models have been developed 
for the study of “socially embedded” fertility behaviour such as that of Kohler (1997). 
Durlauf and Walker (1999) suggest that endogenous social effects generate social multipliers 
which exist when the total effect of an individual’s decision on the overall population 
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behaviour is larger than the initial direct effect of her choice. For example a couple may 
respond directly to the financial incentive of the policy, yet may communicate positive 
experiences of childbearing to friends, colleagues etc. and through social learning induce 
other couples to consider child bearing. 
 
 Kuziemko (2006) explores one aspect of social interaction by using micro level data to test if 
fertility peer effects exist. It was found that the probability of having a child rises by 15% in 
the two years following the birth of a niece or nephew. The effect is strongest when it is a 
sister that has a child and when cost saving from co-ordination is most likely.9  
 
While this paper will not investigate the fertility impact of the baby bonus by utilising these 
behavioural models, these models may be useful in offering potential explanations for 
patterns in the macro-level data considered in this paper.   
 
3. Methodology  
 
In this section the results of two applications of the structural time series models are  
presented. The first examines monthly fertility rates and the second quarterly fertility rates to 
enable key economic variables to be taken into account.  In both instances the fertility rate is 
defined as the number of babies born per 1000 women of child bearing age. The paper uses 
monthly ABS Australian birth data from January 1990-September 2009. 
 
Figure 1 presents the fertility rate beginning in 1990 up until September 2009.  The shaded 
area corresponds to March 2005 to September 2009 identifying the period in which the policy 
could have had an effect, given the nature of the reproductive cycle.  The date at which the 
policy was introduced is also identified. 
 
                                               
9
 Refer to Durlauf and Walker (1999) for a survey of empirical evidence on fertility transitions relevant to the 
social interactions model. 
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Figure 1 Australian Fertility Rates Calculated using Australian Bureau of Statistics 
Data cat. no. 3301 3201.0, 
 
Fertility rates illustrated in Figure 1 changed noticeably after March 2005, approximately 10 
months following the announcement of the baby bonus.  All other things equal, this suggests 
that the policy may have had an impact on fertility rates.  To formally test whether this 
change in pattern is significant a structural time series model is fitted to the data.  Using yt 
denote the fertility rate at time t, the model has the form: 
,
 ), NID(0,~ 2εσε t
                                                  (1)                                                 
where  , , Xt and Zt denote the trend, seasonal, explanatory and policy intervention 
variables at time t.  The coefficients Θ and Φ measure the direction and size of the 
explanatory and policy intervention variables respectively. 
  
Using this specification, the individual behaviour of each component such as the trend and 
seasonal component can be explicitly modelled. Following on from equation (1), the 
expanded form of the model fitted to the data is:  
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Equation (2) is commonly referred to as the observation equation. Equations (2a) to (2c) 
represent the state/component equations. Equation (2a) captures the trend and is made up of 
1−tµ  and 1−tβ , where tβ  captures the growth rate in the series and 1−tµ
 
the level.  
 
While this paper will focus on implications for the baby bonus on fertility rather than 
discretionary birth timing, the Gans and Leigh (GL) birth timing effect can be used as an 
example to illustrate how the policy intervention effects are captured,. The GL effect 
corresponds to two impulse intervention variables, one to capture the abnormal decrease in 
June 2004 and the other to capture the abnormal increase in July 1 2004. Specifically by 
modifying equation (1) such that:  
 
,7,200426,20041 tttt ddy εφφγµ ++++=
                                                                      (3) 
the GL effect can be determined. Specifically if the baby bonus had a significant birth timing 
effect, then the coefficient φ1 should be negative and significantly different from zero and φ2 
should be positive and significantly different from zero (assuming the variable was behaving 
consistent with its historical time path).  
 
4. Results 
 
In the first instance monthly fertility rates are modelled10.  The specification of the first model 
determines whether a fertility effect, as well as the birth timing effects identified by (Gans 
and Leigh 2009) are evident in the monthly fertility rate data.  In terms of the fertility effect, a 
change in the pattern of the data is tested corresponding to the date March 2005, 10 months 
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 Full reports of the model fit is available upon request from the authors 
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following the announcement of the introduction of the baby bonus.  In particular a change in 
the mean is tested. 
Table 1 Selected model estimates for Model 1 
Type Month Coefficient P-
value 
Outlier 2004(6) -0.252 0.003 
Outlier 2004(7) 0.146 0.079 
Outlier 2006(6) -0.062 0.455 
Outlier 2006(7) 0.052 0.527 
Outlier 2008(6) -0.090 0.276 
Outlier 2008(7) 0.143 0.084 
Outlier 2008(12) 0.345 <0.00 
Outlier 2009(1) -0.066 0.425 
Level break  2005(3) 0.216 <0. 00 
 
The results in Table 1 suggest that birth numbers changed significantly approximately nine 
months after the introduction of the baby bonus. Specifically, an additional .216 babies per 
1000 woman of child bearing age, or approximately 1,100 additional babies have been born 
each month since March 2005. 
 
In addition to this fertility change the birth timing effect identified by Gans and Leigh (2009) 
was also tested.  Specifically, was there a short term shift in the number of births 
corresponding to the introduction of the baby bonus in 2004?  The results in Table 1 concur 
with the Gans and Leigh (2009) finding.  However, they do not support their subsequent 
findings regarding a birth timing effect in 2006 as the result of the increased value of the 
baby bonus (Gans and Leigh, 2006). This point’s to the problem of confounding intervention 
estimate effects with trend effects if only short term data is considered. 
 
Similarly, the results do not suggest a birth timing effect corresponding to the 2008 increase 
(assuming α=0.05).  However, they do indicate that in December 2008 an abnormally high 
number of babies were born suggesting the decision to means test families from January 1, 
2009 had a significant impact on the timing of births.   
 
The findings in Table 1 are important as they suggest that there has been a significant 
response in the fertility rate corresponding to the introduction of the baby bonus policy.  They 
also suggest that there has been a short term shift in the number of births as a result of means 
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testing the baby bonus11. This reflects a symmetric response broadly consistent with the 
literature (eg Langridge 2010) that suggests that women residing in higher socioeconomic 
areas were particularly responsive to the introduction of the baby bonus.  
 
The results in Table 1, however, shed little light on whether there has been a temporary or a 
sustained fertility response to policy. Figure 2, therefore presents the trend estimate (note the 
significant intervention effects in Table 1 are included in the trend estimate) for the period 
January 2003 to September 2009.  An increase in the trend in January 2006 is consistent with 
a delayed fertility response to the introduction of the policy. It should be noted that this 
increase in the trend takes place before the July 2006 increase in the baby bonus, and 
therefore potentially reflects a delayed response to the initial introduction of the baby bonus, 
rather than the impact of additional financial incentives. While subsequent growth in birth 
numbers appears to have peaked by January 2008, the true magnitude of this delayed effect 
will become clearer over time as more data becomes available. 
Fertility Trend Estimate : Model 1
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Figure 2 Fertility Rates and trend plus intervention estimates Jan-2003 to Sept-2009 
 
Table 2 presents the results of a refined version of model 1.  The major changes being are the 
elimination of insignificant variables and the inclusion of the slope break intervention effects 
relating to a delayed reaction.  By including the slope breaks it formally tests the delayed 
effect hypothesis. 
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  The changes to the maternity payment that occurred in 2009 are explained in the introduction 
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Table 2: Model 2 
Type Month Coefficient P-
value 
Level break 2005(3) 0.225 0.002 
Slope break 2006(1) 0.015 <0.00 
Slope break 2008(1) -0.019 <0.00 
Outlier 2004(6) -0.263 <0.00 
Outlier 2008(12) 0.347 <0.00 
 
The results in Table 2 support the observations made in relation to Figure 2, and therefore 
concur with the delay hypothesis.  They indicate that at least .225 additional babies have been 
born per 1000 women of child bearing age, per month, since March 2005,(approximately 
1,400 babies) and that this was reinforced by a delayed fertility effect with a cumulative 
increase of .015 babies per 1000 women per month  (approximately 77 babies) every month 
between January 2006 and December 2007.  Importantly the coefficient estimates of the slope 
break approximately add to zero suggesting that the cumulative delayed increases have been 
maintained, that is an approximate additional 3,154 babies have been born each month since 
January 2008.12 Further, these results suggest that up to June 2009 an estimated 119,000 
births can be attributed to the baby bonus policy incentives. The calculated direct cost of each 
additional birth is in the region of $39,000. 13  
4.1 Controlling for economic influence 
 
In this section intervention effects are re-estimated while controlling for economic factors 
that could plausibly be associated with changes in fertility. Changes in women’s’ wages, for 
example, may influence the opportunity cost of bearing and rearing children, while higher 
levels of household income may increase the demand for children. Average weekly earnings 
for females (AWE) and real GDP per capita (RGDPpc) are therefore used in this section as 
controls to test for the effect of baby bonus on birth rates. As the relevant economic data is 
recorded quarterly, this section will consider quarterly, rather than monthly, fertility rates.  
 
Table 3 presents the coefficient estimates of the intervention and economic variables.  For the 
period from January 1990 to September 2009 none of the economic determinants of fertility 
                                               
12
  Calculated as .225 +.36 babies per 1000 women of childbearing age per month 
13
  Refer to the Australian Bureau of Statisics -Year book Australia 2009-10 table 9.22 for a total estimated cost 
of the baby bonus 2004 - 2009  
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tested statistically significant. This may be a reflection of the relatively stable growth 
experienced over the observed period. Importantly, although quarterly rather than monthly 
data was utilised, the intervention effects remain consistent with the findings of the previous 
section, both in terms of the introduction and the delayed effects.  
 
Table 3 Model Output Economic Effect. 
Type Date Coefficient P-
Value 
Outlier 2004 Q2 -0.310 0.061 
Level 
break 
2005 Q1 0.533 <0.000 
Slope 
break 
2006 Q1 0.106 0.002 
Slope 
break 
2008 Q1 -0.175 0.021 
Outlier 2008 Q4 0.175 <0.000 
AWE  0.006 0.523 
RGDPpc  <0.000 0.131 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
This paper analyses the impact of the Australia baby bonus on Australian births between 
March 2005 to September 2009 using an unobservable components model. The results 
indicate a significant increase in birth numbers ten months following the announcement of 
the baby bonus, and that this initial policy introduction effect were maintained, as were the 
cumulative delayed increases in births. The existence of a temporary introduction effect and a 
compression effect are not supported by the data. While the results are consistent with a 
discretionary birth timing effect as a result of the introduction of the baby bonus, the results 
do not support the existence of such an effect following the 2006 increase in the value of the 
baby bonus, in contrast to previous literature.  
 
While this paper has focused on the quantity implications of the baby bonus, both the change 
in births following the means testing of the payment support and other research suggests that 
there may be a heterogeneous response to the policy across the population. Given the delayed 
effects identified in the paper, it may take time for the “quality” implications of the baby 
bonus (ie the wellbeing of the child and utility of the parents) to be fully revealed. A key 
future research focus then, is to assess the variability in the response, and delay in response, 
 14 
to the baby bonus across age, cultural background, socio economic status and education. The 
baby bonus has had a significant and positive effect on fertility rates; however, this effect has 
not been large enough to increase the fertility rate to the replacement level.  Further, the 
recent change of mean testing the baby bonus may reduce the overall influence. This suggests 
that more needs to be done to increase the fertility rate in the interest of future long term 
economic prosperity.  
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